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TWO (FEDERAL) WRONGS MAKE A (STATE) RIGHT:
STATE CLASS-ACTION PROCEDURES AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE OPT-IN CLASS-ACTION
PROVISION OF THE ADEA
Janet M. Bowermaster*

Agnes was discharged from her sales position shortly before
her forty-ninth birthday and was replaced by a twenty-six
year-old. Convinced that her discharge was because of her
age, she consulted an attorney to bring suit against her
employer for age discrimination.
Daunted by the time,
expense, and difficulty that she learned would be involved in
maintaining her suit against her wealthy and powerful
employer, she gave up her lawsuit. Agnes never heard about
the age-discrimination suit that had been filed as a class
action by another employee against the same corporate
employer. If the claim had been for sex discrimination instead
of age discrimination, however, Agnes would have received
notice of the pending class action and could have joined forces
with other "little guy" employees who had victimized by their
employer.
Betty did hear about the class-action suit that had been filed
against her employer for age discrimination. Convinced that
she had been passed over for promotion because of her age,
she contacted the attorney for the class to see what she would
have to do to become a member of the class. When she found
out that she would have to file an individual written consent
with the court, she decided against joining the class. Even
though the attorney told her that it was against the law for
the employer to take adverse employment action against her
for filing a discrimination claim, she was afraid of subtle
harassment. She preferred to remain in the lower position to
avoid becoming the focus of her employer's animosity. If this
claim had been for sex discrimination rather than age discrimination, Betty would have been included automatically in the
class as an unnamed plaintiff unless she took action to keep
from being included.

B.S., Huntington College; M.S., J.D., University of Illinois; currently Associate Professor of Law at California Western School of Law in San Diego, California.
*
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Colleen was fifty-three years old and Black. After she and
a group of other women who were either Black or over forty
were laid off, she filed a suit for sex, race, and age discrimination on behalf of herself and the other similarly situated
employees. The lawsuit became a procedural morass when the
court ruled that the sex- and race-discrimination claims had
to be filed as a Rule 23 "opt-out" class action under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 (Title VII) and the agediscrimination claim as an "opt-in" class action under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 19672 (ADEA). The
conflicting procedural requirements of providing notice to Title
VII litigants versus not notifying ADEA litigants, and opting
in to the ADEA class versus opting out of the Rule 23 class,
left the court, as well as the litigants, unsure of how to
proceed.
These are but a few illustrations of how the ADEA's opt-in
procedure gives victims of age discrimination less procedural
protection than victims of race or sex discrimination under
Title VII.
This Article argues that the opt-in class action of the ADEA
is an anachronism and that age-discrimination litigants can
take advantage of the broader protection afforded to Title VII
litigants by bringing their ADEA suits as Rule 23 class actions
in state courts. A comparison of the two statutes reveals
similar purposes and nearly identical substantive provisions,
but procedural provisions that provide less protection to
victims of age discrimination, including widely disparate classaction provisions. 3
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court appears to have foreclosed the substantive similarity between the acts as a reason
for courts to provide ADEA litigants with the procedural
advantages enjoyed by Title VII litigants.4 Thus, a new way

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
1.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
2.
3.
See infra Part I.
4.
The Court in Lorillard, Div. of Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
(1978), addressed the issue of whether there was a right to jury trial in private civil
actions for lost wages under the ADEA. See id. at 576. The Act itself contained no
provision expressly granting a right to jury trial. Id. at 577. The defendant argued
that the substantive similarities between the ADEA and Title VII meant that the
ADEA, like Title VII, should be construed not to make jury trials available. See id.
at 583.
The Court recognized the similarities in substance and purpose between the two
acts, but stated that reliance on these similarities to find a congressional intent that
both acts be enforced under like procedures was misplaced. See id. at 585. Indeed,
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for victims of age discrimination to receive protection equal to
that of Title VII litigants must be found. State class-action
rules may provide a solution to this problem. Generally, state
procedures control in state courts, even when the state court
hears a federal statutory cause of action.' State procedural
rules, however, may be preempted by federal statutes.6 By
analyzing the case law on procedural preemption, this Article
demonstrates that federal statutes do not preempt state
procedures which are applied evenhandedly to both state and
federal causes of action, which are not outcome determinative,7

the Court indicated that Congress's failure to adopt Title VII enforcement procedures
while adopting its substantive prohibitions in haec verba suggested a desire to avoid
Title VII procedures in enforcing the ADEA. See id. at 584-85.
The Court emphasized that Congress's selective incorporation of certain procedures
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201, and amendment of others
suggested that, except for these departures, Congress "intended to incorporate fully
the remedies and procedures of the FLSA." 434 U.S. at 582. The Court recognized
expressly that when "Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law,
Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation
given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute." Id. at
581.
Nevertheless, the decision and rationale of Lorillarddo not necessarily preclude
a finding that Rule 23 class actions are available under the ADEA. First, in
determining whether the right to jury trial was available in ADEA actions, the Court
noted that § 626(b) of the ADEA empowered courts to grant "legal or equitable relief,"
see id., and § 626(c) authorized individuals to bring actions for "legal and equitable
relief," see id. at 579. The Court followed the cardinal principle of avoiding deciding
constitutional questions when possible by relying on statutory grounds to resolve the
jury trial issue. See id. at 577. Thus, the Court found the similarity of the ADEA
and FLSA procedures dispositive of the jury trial issue in this case. See id. at 582.
However, the Court also said that it could not 'believe that in using the word 'legal',
Congress was oblivious to its long-established meaning or its significance." Id. at
585. This suggests that because "legal" relief was available and "legal" rights were
determined, the Seventh Amendment would likely have provided a right to a jury
trial regardless of the similarity or dissimilarity of the ADEA to other acts.
In addition, the procedural analogy, which the Court rejected in this case,
paralleled a specific substantive difference between the ADEA and Title VII. The
ADEA expressly provides for "legal or equitable" relief, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c), while
Title VII provides only "equitable" remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Moreover, it
should be noted that the implication of the right to jury trial in Lorillardcomported
with the broad, remedial goals of the ADEA.
There is no indication in the Act's broad purposes of any substantive difference
that would justify a more restrictive class-action device for the ADEA than for Title
VII. Extension of the Court's rationale in Lorillardto the issue of the availability of
Rule 23 class actions under the ADEA, on the other hand, would have the effect of
denying this useful remedial device to plaintiffs. It is not clear whether the Court
would be more receptive to procedural analogies to Title VII where to do otherwise
would tend to frustrate the remedial purpose of the ADEA.
5.
See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
6.
See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
7.
See infra notes 101-33 and accompanying text.
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and which do not conflict with the purposes of the federal
statute.' The Article also presents cases in which state courts
have applied state procedures even though the federal statute
being enforced contained a contrary procedural provision.9
The overriding theme of this Article is that state class-action
rules"° ("Rule 23") should not be preempted by the procedural
provisions in the ADEA. The Rule 23 class action neither
discriminates against federal causes of action brought in state
courts nor produces a predictably different outcome than if the
case had been tried in a federal court." Most importantly,
application of state class-action rules does not conflict with the
ADEA's purpose. The history of the ADEA's opt-in provision
suggests that the provision may have been retained in the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by mistake and may then
have been incorporated improvidently from the FLSA into the
ADEA.' 2 This Article argues that employees can best be
served by according victims of age discrimination the same
degree of procedural protection that is available under Rule 23
"opt-out" class actions.
Finally, the Article notes that the application of state classaction procedures to ADEA actions can be defeated by removal
of the cause of action to federal court where federal rules of
civil procedure control. Of course, not all defendants will seek
to remove ADEA cases. Some may want to avail themselves
of more familiar state court procedures, judges and juries they
believe will be more sympathetic to their cause of action, or a

See infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
8.
See infra note 127.
9.
See ALA. R. CIv. P. 23; ALASKA R. CIrv. P. 23; ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 23; ARK. R.
10.
Civ. P. 23; CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 378,382 (West 1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 23; CONN. R.
SUPER. CT. 87-90; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23; D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 23; FLA. R. CIV. P.
1.220; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-23 (Michie 1982 & 1991 Supp.); HAW. R. CIv. P. 23; IDAHO
R. CIv. P. 23(a)-(e); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-801 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IND. R.
TRIAL P. 23; IOWA R. CIv. P. 42.1-42.20; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223 (1983); KY. R. CIv.
P. 23; LA. CODE CIv. P. ANN. arts. 591-597 (West 1960); ME. R. CIv. P. 23; MD. R. CIrv.
P.-CIR. CT. 2-231; MASS. R. CIrv. P. 23; MICH. CT. R. 3.501; MINN. R. Cirv. P. DIST. CT.
23; Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.08; MONT. R. CIv. P. 23; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (1989); NEV. R.
Civ. P. DIST. CT. 23; N.H.R. SUPER. CT. 27-A; N.J.R. Cirv. PRAC. 4:32; N.M.R. CIv. P.
DIST. CT. 1-023; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 901-909 (McKinney 1976); N.C.R. CIv. P. 23;
N.D.R. CIv. P. 23; OHIO R. Civ. P. 23; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023 (1990 Supp.); OR. R.
Civ. P. 32; PA. R. CIrv. P. 1701-1716; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 23; S.C.R. Civ. P. 23;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-23(a) to -23(d) (1984 & Supp. 1991); TENN. R. CIV. P.
23; TEx. R. CIrv. P. 42; UTAH R. Civ. P. 23; VT. R. CIv. P. 23; WASH. SUPER. CT. CiV. R.
23; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 803.08 (West 1977); WYO. R. CIV. P. 23.
See infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
11.
See infra notes 148-200 and accompanying text.
12.
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more conveniently located forum. When the defendant does
seek to remove, the circuits remain split on whether ADEA
actions are removable. 3 Although removability has been
allowed, 4 this Article argues that ADEA actions should be
interpreted as being non-removable in order to best effectuate
the remedial purposes of the Act.

I. TITLE VII AND THE ADEA SHARE SIMILAR
SUBSTANCE AND PURPOSE

Both Title VII and the ADEA grew out of the same line of
antidiscrimination legislation born of the long struggle for
equal opportunity in the United States. This struggle had its
beginnings in the Civil Rights Acts of 187015 and 187 1,16 which
were passed to correct racially discriminatory practices after
the Civil War.' 7
Spurred on by civil rights activism in the early 1960s, Congress realized the need for more comprehensive federal
legislation." The Civil Rights Act of 1964"9 was intended to be

13.
See infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
14.
See, e.g., Baldwin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 F.2d 458, 461 (5th Cir.
1982); Jacobi v. High Point Label, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 518, 521 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
15.
Ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988)).
16.
Ch. 22, §§ 1, 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13-14 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985 (1988)).
17.
Section 18 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 expressly reenacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, which was passed to effectuate the 13th
Amendment's abolition of slavery. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Trumbull).
18.
As the House Committee on the Judiciary stated in its report:
Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipation, Negroes, who
make up over 10 percent of our population, are by virtue of one or another type
of discrimination not accorded the rights, privileges, and opportunities which
are considered to be, and must be, the birthright of all citizens.
Considerable progress has been made in eliminating discrimination in many
areas because of local initiative either in the form of State laws and local
ordinances or as the result of voluntary action. Nevertheless, in the last decade
it has become increasingly clear that progress has been too slow and that
national legislation is required to meet a national need which becomes ever
more obvious.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18, reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2391, 2393.
19.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447
(1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1988)).
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this broadly sweeping measure. 2° The Act had separate titles
devoted to voting rights;2 ' desegregation of public accommodations,2 2 public facilities,23 and public education; 24 and nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs.2" Title VII of
the Act was aimed specifically at eradicating discrimination in
employment.26
Title VII prohibits employment practices which discriminate
either directly or indirectly2 7 on the basis of race, color,
national origin, religion, or sex.28 Its provisions extend to
private employers, 29 employment agencies,3 ° unions,3 ' and
federal agencies and officials.3 2
Although Congress intended Title VII to be a comprehensive

antidiscrimination statute, 3 the statute did not mention age.
Congress had considered the problem of age discrimination

when enacting Title VII,'

but did not include prohibitions

against age discrimination because the extent of age discrimination in the workplace was not certain. 3' Rather, Congress

See H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 18, pt. 2, at 2, reprinted in 1964
20.
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2488.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 101, 78 Stat. at 241.
21.
Id. § 201, 78 Stat. at 243.
22.
Id. § 301, 78 Stat. at 246.
23.
Id. § 401, 78 Stat. at 246.
24.
Id. § 601, 78 Stat. at 252.
25.
H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 26, reprinted in 1964
26.
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2401. Title VII currently makes it unlawful... for an employer...
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
Title VII prohibits not only overtly discriminatory business practices, but
27.
also facially neutral practices that are discriminatory in operation. See, e.g., Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
137 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
28.
Id. § 2000e-2(a). The Act defines the term "employer" as "a person
29.
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year." Id. § 2000e(b).
Id. § 2000e-2(b).
30.
Id. § 2000e-2(c).
31.
Id. § 2000e-16(a).
32.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
33.
See 110 CONG. REC. 2596-97 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler), reprinted
34.
in U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNnrY COMMN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLFS VII AND
IX OF CIVIL RIGHTs ACT OF 1964, 3166-67 (1968) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY], see
also 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
See 110 CONG. REC. 2596-97 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler), reprinted
35.
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 34, at 3166-67.
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opted for further study of the problem by the Secretary of
Labor.3" This study ultimately led to the enactment of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967."7
The stated purpose of the ADEA is "to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to
help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment."3 8 The ADEA's
prohibitions against age discrimination in employment extend
40
39
to the practices of private employers, employment agencies,
labor organizations, 4 1 and most branches of the federal government. 42 These prohibitions generally remove age as a consideration in employment decisions, except when it "is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business." 43 The Act protects
workers who are at least forty years of age."
The similarity of scope and purpose between Title VII and
the ADEA has been widely recognized.4 5 Whether that

36.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 715, 78 Stat. at 265, directed the Secretary of
Labor to study the problem of age discrimination and to report the findings to
Congress. The data collected by the Secretary of Labor is reported in U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF
THE SECRErARY OF LABOR To THE CoNGRFss UNDER SECION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964 (1965) [hereinafter THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER].
37.
H.R. REP. NO. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214.
38.
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
39.
Id. § 623(a). The prohibition extends to those employers engaged in
commerce with 20 or more employees. Id. § 630(b).
40.
Id. § 623(b).
41.
Id. § 623(c).
42.
Id. § 633a(a). Congress extended the ADEA's prohibition against age
discrimination to branches of the federal government in 1974. Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(b)(2), 88 Stat. 55, 74, amended by Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 5(a),
(e), 92 Stat. 189, 191 (1978).
43.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
44.
Id. § 631(a).
45.
See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)
(recognizing common purpose and similarities in language between Title VII and the
ADEA and analogizing from Title VII to find that individuals in deferral states are
required to resort to appropriate state proceedings before bringing suit under the
ADEA); Lorillard, Div. of Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 589 (1978)
(recognizing important similarities between the aims and substantive prohibitions of
the ADEA and Title VII, but declining to analogize on right to jury trial); Donnelly
v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 402, 408-09 (7th Cir. 1989) (considering
similarity of purpose and substantive prohibitions between Title VII and the ADEA
in finding that like the concurrent jurisdiction of ADEA cases, state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction of Title VII claims as well), affd, 494 U.S. 820
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similarity argues for analogous interpretations of procedural
aspects of the two acts, however, appears to depend on the
history and context of the specific provisions in question.46

II. TITLE VII AND THE ADEA: PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES
Despite the fact that both Title VII and the ADEA were
passed to stop discrimination,4 7 the two acts have many
differences,48 the most striking of which is the difference in
class-action provisions.

(1990); Nabors v. United States, 568 F.2d 657, 659 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) (collecting
cases referring to the interpretation of Title VII for assistance in defining analogous
sections of the ADEA because the acts are so similar).
In one context, the Supreme Court stated:
46.
Since the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace, since the language of § 14 (b) [of the ADEA]
is almost in haec verba with § 706 (c) [of Title VII], and since the legislative
history of § 14 (b) indicates that its source was § 706 (c), we may properly
conclude that Congress intended that the construction of § 14 (b) [requiring
prior resort to appropriate state proceedings before filing suit in federal court]
should follow that of § 706 (c).
Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 756; see also Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584 ("There are
But in deciding
important similarities between the two statutes, to be sure ....
whether a statutory right to jury trial exists, it is the remedial and procedural
provisions of the two laws that are crucial and there we find significant differences.");
Donnelly, 874 F.2d at 409 ("Given the extensive similarities between the two statutes,
and the fact that state courts have jurisdiction over private-sector ADEA claims, it
seems incongruous to assume that state courts are incompetent to adjudicate Title
VII claims."); Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 1984)
(distinguishing the restrictive procedures for notice to potential class members under
opt-in provision of the ADEA from the liberal notice procedures for Rule 23 class
actions).
See supra notes 20, 26, 38 and accompanying text.
47.
The ADEA contains bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), bona fide
48.
seniority or employee benefits plan, and good cause exceptions. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)
(1988). Although Title VII includes BFOQ and seniority exceptions, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e), (h) (1988), it has no corresponding good cause exception. In addition,
Title VII has some exceptions that the ADEA does not: it makes an exception for
matters of national security, id. § 2000e-2(g); it gives employers the right to use
results of professionally developed ability tests so long as they are not used to
discriminate, id. § 2000e-2(h); and it permits businesses located near Indian
reservations to give preferential treatment to Indians, id. § 2000e-2(i).
Actions under the ADEA may be tried to a jury with legal damages available, 29
U.S.C. § 626(c), while Title VII litigation is restricted to the bench, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(4), for equitable relief and/or backpay, id. § 2000e-5(g).
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A. Title VII-Rule 23 Class Action

The legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress intended the Act to be enforced primarily through
private lawsuits rather than administrative oversight.4 9
In keeping with this intent, the Act's procedural provisions
give individual employees the right to bring civil actions
in federal district courts against employers who engage in
discriminatory employment practices.' °
Although Congress did not expressly provide for class actions as a
statutory enforcement mechanism,5 1 both Congress5 2 and
49.
Senators Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) and Everett M. Dirksen (R-Ill.)
both explained that under their compromise, only the Justice Department would be
authorized to bring suit, and then only in cases of "pattern or practice" violations; the
primary responsibility for enforcement was left to the individual complainant. 110
CONG. REC. 12,722, 12,817 (1964), reprintedin partin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
34, at 3003-04, 3018-19.
For a discussion of this legislative history, see Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400
F.2d 28, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1968); Judith J. Johnson, Rebuilding the Barriers: The
Trend in Employment DiscriminationClass Actions, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,
3-5 (1987); George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688,692-96
(1980); David Scanga, Comment, Title VII Class Actions: A New Era?, 62 NEB. L.
REV. 130, 134 (1983).
50.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988). Before bringing a civil action, an
aggrieved employee must first file a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. § 2000e-5(e). The EEOC then serves notice of
the complaint on the respondent. Id. § 2000e-5(b). After investigation, if the EEOC
determines that reasonable cause exists to believe the charge is true, the Commission
will try to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Id. If, after 180 days from the time the
complaint was filed, the EEOC has not been able to obtain a conciliation agreement
between the respondent and the aggrieved employee, and the EEOC or the Attorney
General has not filed a civil action against the respondent employer, the Commission
or the Attorney General must notify the aggrieved employee. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Receipt of the notice, commonly called the "right to sue" notice, then gives the
aggrieved employee the right to bring a civil action against the respondent named in
her EEOC complaint. Id. She must file her action within 90 days of receipt of the
notice. Id.
51.
See Rutherglen, supra note 49, at 695-96; David L. Biek, Note, The
Scourge of Age Discriminationin the Workplace: Fighting Back with a Liberalized
Class Action Vehicle and Notice Provision, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 106-07
(1986).
52.
See Johnson, supra note 49, at 5. In 1971, Congress considered an
amendment to Title VII which would have authorized the EEOC to issue cease and
desist orders. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(h) (1971). Opponents argued, inter
alia, that such authority was unnecessary because the federal courts were enforcing
the statutes effectively through private class actions. See H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 58-67 (1971) (minority views); S. REP. NO. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
85-88 (1971) (views of Sen. Dominick). The version of the bill that passed the House
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the courts 53 recognize the class action as a useful and
effective device for handling Title VII litigation.
Class actions under Title VII must meet the requirements
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.54 Rule 23
requires that an identifiable class of persons exist and that the
named plaintiff be an adequate representative for the class.55
Adequate representation is constitutionally required56 in order
to provide due process to members of the
class who are bound
57
by the judgment in a class-action suit.

B. The ADEA--Opt-In Class Action
Although Congress took the substantive provisions of the
ADEA directly from Title VII,5" it took the procedural framework for enforcement of the ADEA from the FLSA. 59 As a

result, individual employees may bring civil actions against

would have eviscerated the class-action mechanism in Title VII cases by requiring
that all class members either file, or be named in, the charge. See H.R. 1746, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. § (3)(a), (e) (1971). Congress rejected that requirement, and the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare endorsed the use of class actions by
'agree[ing] with the courts that [T]itle VII actions are by their very nature class
complains [sic], and that any restriction on such actions would greatly undermine"
Title VII's effectiveness. S. REP. No. 415, supra, at 27.
53.
See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 273 (4th
Cir. 1980); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968); Local 186, Intl Pulp,
Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284,
1287 (N.D. Ind. 1969); see also S. REP. No. 415, supra note 52, at 27 n.16 (listing
cases that the committee interprets as the courts' acknowledgement that Title VII
suits are "class complaints" and that any restriction on the use of class actions would
undermine the effectiveness of Title VII).
54.
East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977).
55.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); see also 7A CHARLEf A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1765 (2d ed. 1986).
56.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
57.
Id. at 44-46.
58.
See Lorillard, Div. of Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584
(1978). Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(c) (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (c)
(1988).
59.
Section 626(b) of the ADEA provides that "[t]he provisions of [the ADEA]
shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided
in [certain sections of the FLSA]." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). See also 113 CONG. REC.
31,254 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("The enforcement techniques provided by
S. 830 are directly analogous to those available under the Fair Labor Standards Act;
in fact, S. 830 incorporates by reference, to the greatest extent possible, the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.").
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their employers for age discrimination"° and may use the
class-action device to litigate their claims.6 1 However, each
employee who wishes to join an ADEA class action must file
a written consent with the court to become a party plaintiff.6 2
This "opt-in" class action' clearly affords less protection to
potential plaintiffs in age-discrimination suits than a Rule 23
"opt-out" class action does to potential plaintiffs in employmentdiscrimination suits based on sex or race. Under Rule 23(b)(1)
and (b)(2) class actions, members of the class are automatically
included in the lawsuit.' Under Rule 23(b)(3), notice is sent to
potential members of the class; those who do not take action
promptly to opt out are included in the class, and their rights
are protected in the litigation.6 5
Under the ADEA's opt-in class-action procedure, potential
members of the class are not always given notice of the

60.
29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1988).
Before bringing any private action, an
individual must file a charge with the EEOC alleging unlawful discrimination. Id.
§ 626(d). This charge must be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful
practice occurred. Id. § 626(d)(1). The Commissioner must then seek to eliminate the
unlawful practice through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and
persuasion. Id. § 626(d). The employee also may bring suit to enforce his rights. Id.
§ 626(c)(1). However, the employee may bring a private action only if (1) after 60
days from the filing of a charge, the EEOC is unsuccessful in reaching an agreement
with the employer through informal methods, id. § 626(d), and (2) the EEOC fails to
bring an action on behalf of the employee, id. § 626(c)(1). For a discussion of Title VII
procedures, see supra note 50.
61.
Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that an action "may be maintained
against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of
competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or
themselves and other employees similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988):
62.
Id. ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he
gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the
court in which such action is brought.").
63.
Because unnamed class members must file written consents with the
court in order to become parties plaintiff, class actions under the FLSA and the
ADEA have come to be known as "opt-in" class actions. See Monroe v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 638, 638-39 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
64.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) provides in part that '[tihe judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be
members of the class."
65.
The second sentence of Rule 23(c)(3) states:
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those
to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have
not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
FED. R. CIrV. P. 23(c)(3).
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litigation. 6 It is a matter within the discretion of the trial
court whether the court will order that potential plaintiffs be
notified.6 7 Moreover, even when notice is given, those who fail
to take action promptly may be excluded from the litigation
and their rights left unprotected. 6 Each person in an opt-in
class action must take positive action to become a member of
the class.69
In addition, in a Rule 23 class action, courts suspend the
running of the statute of limitations for the asserted members
of the class while the class-certification question is decided.7"
This protection is not afforded to members of the opt-in class
action under the ADEA. There the statute of limitations is
tolled for unnamed class members only after they file their
individual consents with the court.7 ' Some courts have
recognized the inequality of this approach and have allowed
for equitable tolling of the statute.7 2

66.
See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169-70 (1989).
67.
Id. at 169.
68.
Id. at 172-73.
69.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988); see also Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d
859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977); Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532, 536 (8th Cir.
1975); La Chapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 287-88 (5th Cir. 1975).
70.
See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983);
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554, 561 (1974).
71.
29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) (1988) prescribes the statute of limitations for ADEA
actions by incorporating the limitations period set forth in § 255 of the Portal-toPortal Act. Section 256 of the Portal-to-Portal Act specifies when the limitations
period provided for in § 255 begins to run:
In determining when an action is commenced for the purposes of section 255
of this title, an action ... shall be considered to be commenced on the date
when the complaint is filed; except that in the case of a collective or class action
... it shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any individual
claimant(a) on the date when the complaint is filed, if he is specifically named as a party
plaintiff in the complaint and his written consent to become a party plaintiff is
filed on such date in the court in which the action is brought; or
(b) if such written consent was not so filed or if his name did not so appear-on
the subsequent date on which such written consent is filed in the court in which
the action was commenced.
29 U.S.C. § 256 (1988).
Courts agree that such consents do not relate back to the date the original
complaint was filed. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 546 F. Supp. 54, 60-61 (E.D.
Mich. 1982), affd, 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984); Kuhn v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 487
F. Supp. 974, 975-76 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd, 745 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1984).
72.
See, e.g., Owens v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 630 F. Supp. 309, 311-12
(S.D.W. Va. 1986); cf. Partlow v. Jewish Orphans Home of S. Cal., Inc., 645 F.2d 757,
760-61 (9th Cir. 1981) (tolling the statute of limitations for an FLSA claim). But cf.
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III. ADEA SUITS AS RULE 23 CLASS ACTIONS IN
STATE COURTS

A. The Typical ProceduralPreemptionAnalysis

The ADEA expressly allows state courts concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over claims arising under the statute. 3 When a state court hears a lawsuit, the court follows
state rules of procedure even when the right sought to be
enforced arises out of a federal statute. 74 This is because
courts in the United States operate in a dual system of
federalism.7 5 Federal courts derive their power to adjudicate
from Congress,76 while state courts derive their power to
function as courts from the authority of the states creating
them. 7 Thus, while Congress can choose whether to entrust
the enforcement of the substantive rights it has created to
these state courts,7" it cannot give them jurisdiction over
actions arising under that federal law.7 9 Also, where a state
court does exercise its jurisdiction over a federal cause of
action, Congress cannot regulate or dictate the procedures it
employs.8 0
This rule, however, is not absolute. The substantive rights
created by federal legislation are binding upon state as well as

Groshek v. Babcock & Wilcox Tubular Prods. Div., 425 F. Supp. 232, 234 (E.D. Wis.
1977) (refusing to toll the statute of limitations for an FLSA claim).
73.
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1988) provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved may
bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable
relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter."
74.
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S.
177, 195 (1960); Missouri ex rel. St. L., B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 208 (1924)
("The origin of the right does not affect the manner of administering the remedy.");
Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217-21 (1916).
75.
See Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 217; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The RelationsBetween
State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 489, 506-08 (1954).
76.
U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1; see also Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
1 Stat. 73.
77.
See Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 222.
78.
See Taylor, 266 U.S. at 208; see also Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 218; Exparte
Gounis, 263 S.W. 988, 990 (Mo. 1924).
79.
Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Exparte Gounis, 263 S.W. at 990; Niehaus v. Joseph Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 164
S.W.2d 180, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942).
80.
Ex parte Gounis, 263 S.W. at 990; Niehaus, 164 S.W.2d at 186.
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federal courts.8 1 Thus, to the extent that state procedural
rules "dig" into federal substantive rights, 2 they are preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Courts faced with state procedural provisions must
first determine whether the provisions are truly "procedural"
rather than substantive. 4 If they are found to be procedural,
the court asks whether they affect federal substantive rights
by discriminating against the federal cause of action, by
affecting the outcome of the case, or by vitiating the federal
statute's purpose. 5
In deciding whether federal law preempts state procedural
provisions, courts first consider the nature of the state
provision. Traditionally, the state provision in question has
been characterized either as substantive, in which case it was
preempted by the federal substantive law, or procedural, in
which case it was not preempted. 6 Such characterization,
however, has tended to come after, or even as a substitute for,
striking a proper balance between federal and state interests,
with the courts simply summarizing their conclusions under
the rubric of "substance" and "procedure." 7
The basic premise from which analysis on this issue proceeds is that a state court may not use its own procedure if the
effect is to substantially impair the federal right.8 This broad
generality, however, provides little guidance in determining
how much federal law needs to be applied to keep the federal
rights intact. As a result, formulating a precise rule to

81.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) ("If any
one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it
would be this-that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is
supreme within its sphere of action."); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150-53
(1988) (holding that federal procedure preempts state procedure that infringes upon
the claimant's substantive federal right); Niehaus, 164 S.W.2d at 186 (holding that
in cases arising under the FLSA, federal law binds the states with respect to the
rights created by the law, although a state court hearing the case may apply state
rules of practice and procedure).
82.
Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949).
83.
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962); Brown, 338 U.S. at 296.
84.
See, e.g., St. L.S.W. Ry. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411 (1985) (per
curiam); Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511 (1915).
85.
See, e.g., Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2442 (1990);
Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989); Felder, 487 U.S. at 138-41.
86.
See, e.g., White, 238 U.S. at 512.
87.
Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARv. L. REV.
1551, 1557 (1960).
88.
See Samuel S. Wilson, Note, ProceduralProtectionfor FederalRights in
State Courts, 30 U. CIN. L. REV. 184, 185 (1961).
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distinguish "substance" from "procedure" has proven very
troublesome indeed.89
One aspect involved in determining that a state rule is
substantive in nature is whether the rule has the effect of
adding to the burden required for a plaintiff to sustain a cause
of action.9" The underlying reasoning of cases in this area
appears to be:
[I]f one jurisdiction permits a plaintiff to recover if he
establishes facts A and B, and another jurisdiction permits
the plaintiff to recover only if he establishes facts A, B,
and C, the rule which requires the plaintiff to establish
... fact C is not really procedural but "part of the very
substance" of his case. 9 '
Even if a court determines that a provision does not add
directly to a plaintiff's substantive burden and is thus procedural, it still examines whether the state rule in question
discriminates against the federal cause of action.92 Although
a state court may adhere to its procedural requirements, it
may not defeat the substance of a federal claim under the
guise of professing merely to prescribe how the claim should
be formulated.9 3 The focus of this inquiry is "whether the...
courts have merely enforced a local [procedural] requirement
... applicable to all such litigation in [the state] without
qualifying the basis of recovery under the [flederal...
[a]ct or
94
plaintiff."
the
against
scales
the
weighting
The Supreme Court recently applied this approach in Felder
v. Casey.9" In that case, the Court considered a state procedural
89.
See id. ; see also Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949) (reversing
the Georgia court's dismissal of a claim arising under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act because such strict application of local procedural rules impinged upon
rights under the Act).
90.
See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141-45 (1988) (finding a state statute
which has the effect of granting defendants an additional affirmative defense to be
preempted); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248-49 (1942) (finding
a state rule that switched the burden of proof from defendant to plaintiff to be
preempted); Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915) (finding a Vermont
rule requiring plaintiffs to prove lack of contributory negligence to be preempted).
91.
Alfred Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions-The
Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 384, 389 (1956).
92.
See Brown, 338 U.S. at 298-99; American Ry. Express Co. v. Levee, 263
U.S. 19, 21 (1923).
93.
Brown, 338 U.S. at 298-99.
94.
Id. at 301 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
95.
487 U.S. 131 (1988).
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rule requiring plaintiffs to file a notice of claim prior to filing a
state court suit against local governmental entities or officers.9 6
The Court held that the notice-of-claim statute was inapplicable
to section 1983 actions brought in the state courts.9 7 The
majority stated that the notice-of-claim provision was not a
neutral and uniformly applicable rule of procedure, "'rooted in
policies unrelated to the definition of any particular substantive
cause of action, that forms no essential part of "the cause of
action" as applied to any given plaintiff.'" 9 Rather, it viewed
the provision as "a substantive burden imposed only'upon those
who [sought] redress for injuries resulting from the use or
misuse of governmental authority."9 9 The Court found that the
provision discriminated against the precise right that Congress
had created in section 1983 because an intentional tort victim
was given two years to recognize the injury while a civil rights
victim was given only four months to recognize that he had
been deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right.10 0
Another way that the courts have identified apparently
procedural rules that produce substantive effects is to ask
whether the state procedural rule would produce a different
outcome to the litigation in the state court than a federal rule
would have produced in a federal court.'
Procedural rules
producing different outcomes in different courts run afoul of a
basic tenet of our jurisprudential system: treating like cases
alike.' °2 The heart of this concept is that a litigant's choice to
sue in a state rather than a federal court should not affect the
outcome of his case. 1 3 The mere fact that state procedural

96.
Id. at 136-37, 143-45.
97.
Id. at 138.
98.
Id. at 145 (quoting Brief for International City Management Association
et al. as Amici Curiae at 22, Felder (No. 87-526)).
99.
Id. at 141. While the majority found the defendant-specific nature of the
notice-of-claim provision dispositive of discrimination against the federal substantive
rights, Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, in dissent, found it sufficiently nondiscriminatory that the state statute "applie[d] to all actions against municipal
defendants, whether brought under state or federal law." Id. at 160. They suggested
that "the Wisconsin statute 'discriminates' only against a right that Congress has
never created: the right of a plaintiff to have the benefit of selected federal court
procedures after the plaintiff has rejected the federal forum and chosen a state forum
instead." Id. at 161.
100.
Id. at 141-42.
101.
See, e.g., id. at 141.
102.
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-78 (1938).
103.
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); Erie, 304
U.S. at 75-78.
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rules sometimes produce a different outcome, however, is not
dispositive.' °4 The essential inquiry that remains is whether
the state procedure is inconsistent with or conflicts with the
goals of the federal statute sought to be enforced. 10 5 More
specifically, the question is whether the enforcement of the
state rule or procedure stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.
In determining whether local practice puts "unreasonable
obstacles in the way"' ° of the federal right, there is some
weighing of the policy considerations that are always relevant
when one sovereign enforces a right created by another. In the
"converse Erie" situation, where a state enforces a federally
created right, there is a constitutional obligation arising from
the Supremacy Clause to effectuate the intent of Congress
embodied in the federal act. 0 7 This puts a great deal of emphasis on the interpretation of the statute. Yet, in addition to
respecting constitutional limitations, Congress no doubt also
has some interest in achieving a degree of federal-state
accommodation. It has thus become customary in ascertaining
congressional purpose to compare the significance of the policy
behind the federal law with that behind the state practice. 0 "

104.
Compare Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 152 (1988) (finding invalid a state
notice-of-claim statute that permitted a state court to dismiss a federal cause of
action that would have survived in federal court because it placed a 'substantive
condition on the right to sue") with Missouri ex rel. St. L., B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266
U.S. 200, 207-09 (1924) (finding valid state court jurisdiction over the case under a
state service-by-garnishment procedure that is unavailable in federal court, because
it 'does not enlarge the substantive right").
105.
See Felder, 487 U.S. at 138 (holding that a state notice-of-claim provision
cannot be applied to a § 1983 action because it conflicts with the purposes and
objectives of§ 1983); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 491 (1916) (finding
a state procedure for determining compensation to be preempted because 'the
question of the proper measure of damages is inseparably connected with the right
of action, and in cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act it must be
settled according to general principles of law as administered in the Federal courts").
106.
Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 25 (1923).
107.
See Hill, supra note 91, at 387.
108.
The balancing of state and federal interests in applying their respective
procedural laws was applied first in diversity cases. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-39 (1958). It has subsequently been applied in
the reverse Erie situation as well. See, e.g., Harding v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44
(1989); Felder, 487 U.S. at 141-45; James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1984);
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 512 n.7 (1978); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
422-23 (1965); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1965); Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 318-20 (1958); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court
Forfeituresof FederalRights, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1128, 1142-45; Wilson, supra note 88,
at 195-96.
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In the typical case where state procedures have been applied
in enforcing federal substantive rights in state courts, the
federal statute has been silent on the particular procedure at
issue. Hunt v. National Linen Service Corp.,1"9 for example,
dealt with the specificity of the plaintiffs pleadings regarding
the amount of money due, the quantity of overtime worked,
and the compensation paid by the defendant to the plaintiff
and other parties of interest under the FLSA. 110 The Supreme
Court of Tennessee expressly noted that the FLSA did not
address the point and held that the issue was governed by the
state procedural provision.'1 ' The court then dismissed
the
112
FLSA claim for lack of specificity under state law.
3
A Texas court made a similar notation in Munn v. Mohler"
where it applied a state statute relating to the venue of civil
actions." 4 The Texas Court of Appeals pointed out that the
FLSA did not address the point." 5 It then rejected the
argument that the FLSA provision authorizing the claimant
to maintain his action in any court of competent jurisdiction
could be interpreted as manifesting a congressional intent to
deprive a state inhabitant of his right to be sued in the county
6
of his domicile as provided by the state venue statute."
In Morgan v. Monessen Southwestern Railway Co.," 7 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the state prejudgment
interest provision in a Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA) action after noting that the federal statute neither
provided for nor forbade the award of prejudgment interest." 8
The court determined interest to be essentially a question of
local law and indicated that for purposes of harmony and
uniformity of administration, state statutes relating to interest
should be applied whenever it was practical to do so." 9
This does not mean that where the federal statute is silent,
12
the states are free to apply whatever procedures they wish.
When a federal statute does not provide for universally
109.
157 S.W.2d 608 (Tenn. 1941).
110.
Id. at 610.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
251 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
114.
Id. at 803.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
518 A.2d 1171 (Pa. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 330 (1988).
118.
Id. at 1176-77.
119.
Id.
120.
See Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073 (1985).
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familiar procedures that are considered necessary for day-today adjudications, the state may fill in its own procedures. 2 '
State statutes of limitations, for instance, have been applied
where the federal acts failed to provide one, under the
assumption "that Congress did not intend to create a right
enforceable in perpetuity."'2 2 In Felder, however, the Court
determined that notice-of-claim provisions were not "universally familiar nor in any sense indispensable prerequisites to
litigation, and there is thus no reason to suppose that Congress intended federal courts to apply such rules, which
'significantly inhibit the ability to bring federal actions.' "123
State procedures may also be available to enforce federal
rights in state courts where the federal statute granting the
substantive right makes specific provision for a different
procedure to be applied. Professor Hill suggests that although
"federal paramountcy extends as much to procedural as to
substantive matters,"'2 4 the basic postulates of our federalism
preclude carrying this notion to the point where the distinction
between the federal and state courts is effectively obliterated.' 25 There are limits, he asserts, to "the machinery of
state government ... being remolded for federal purposes
insofar as the state courts, in the exercise of a jurisdiction
which they ordinarily have no power to decline, are compelled
to conduct themselves in all substantial respects as if they
were federal courts." 26 Indeed, state procedural rules have
sometimes been applied
in the face of contrary provisions in
27
the federal statute.'

121.
Id. at 1503-04.
122.
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 140 (1988) (describing lower courts'
reasoning in applying state statutes of limitations when federal acts are silent).
123.
Id. at 140 (quoting Brown, 742 F.2d at 1507).
124.
Hill, supra note 91, at 387.
125.
Id. at 413.
126.
Id.
127.
See, e.g., Schimerowski v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 551, 555
(Iowa 1972) (applying state law intervention rules in the face of an FLSA provision
allowing joinder); Rockwood v. Crown Laundry Co., 178 S.W.2d 440, 441-43 (Mo.
1944) (applying state laws of joinder in the face of FLSA § 216 which authorizes
action on behalf of others similarly situated); Niehaus v. Joseph Greenspon's Son Pipe
Corp., 164 S.W.2d 180, 185-86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942) (same); Archer v. Musick, 25
N.W.2d 908, 911 (Neb. 1947) (applying state law assignment rules in the face of an
FLSA provision for additional parties to join the action by becoming class-action
plaintiffs); Sauerzopf v. North Am. Cement Corp., 93 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. 1950)
(finding that Congress did not intend an FLSA provision concerning when the statute
of limitations was to start running to apply to state courts); Sipe v. Pohland Bros.,
19 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 63, 64 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Westmoreland County 1969)
(finding that an FLSA suit brought in state court is governed by that court's
procedure).
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On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has held on at
least one occasion that a procedural provision in a federal
128
statute controlled over state modes of practice and procedure.
These cases may be viewed as state courts protecting their
sovereignty by applying state rules of practice and procedure
and the Supreme Court applying federal law to ensure federal
supremacy. The cases also can be reconciled by looking at
differences in the nature of the provisions at issue. The
provision at issue in Mitchell v. Clark,'29 for example, was
inseparable from the substantive relief that Congress intended
to provide. 30 In contrast, procedural provisions such as
joinder traditionally have been considered
to be among the
13
more purely procedural provisions.'
Congress's ability to prescribe procedures for the enforce32
ment of federal statutes in state courts is not unlimited.
Notions of federalism rooted in the U.S. Constitution preclude
Congress from transforming state courts into federal court
clones by dictating in too great detail the procedures that state
courts must follow in enforcing federal rights. 33 In the
absence of other guidance from the courts, it seems reasonable
that the same considerations that inform the decision as to

128.
See Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 646 (1884). The statute in Mitchell
created a retroactive federal defense for wrongful acts or omissions done by officers
or persons pursuant to military orders during the Civil War. Id. at 639. The state
court in Mitchell determined that the defense had been improperly pleaded under
state rules of procedure because it did not set out a copy of the military order on
which the defense was founded. Id. at 645. The Supreme Court noted that the
federal statute creating the defense had expressly provided that the order pleaded
in defense under that statute could be "written or verbal, general or special." Id.
The Court determined that Congress had intentionally specified that manner of
pleading in order to effectuate the liberal purposes of the Act under conditions where
persons were compelled to obey military authority in time of war without the
opportunity to obtain copies of the orders under which they were forced to act. Id.
at 645-46. The Court thus overruled the Missouri Supreme Court and applied
federal law to the question of whether the defense had been properly pleaded. Id. at
646.
129.
Id. at 638.
130.
See id. at 641-42. Mitchell's war-order defense would have been largely
unavailable without the liberalized pleading provisions in the federal statute as the
majority of persons who had been forced to obey military orders during wartime had
been in no position to demand that they be shown copies of the orders under which
they were compelled to act. See id. at 646.
131.
See, e.g., Lee v. Central of Ga. Ry., 252 U.S. 109, 110 (1920); Shain v.
Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488, 490 (W.D. Ky. 1941); Niehaus v. Joseph Greenspon's
Son Pipe Corp., 164 S.W.2d 180, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942); see also Wilson, supra note
88, at 190.
132.
See Hill, supra note 91, at 413.
133.
Id.
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whether state procedures may be applied where the federal act
has not addressed the procedural issue may be useful in
determining the appropriate federal/state balance where there
is a contrary procedural provision embedded in a federal
statute. Application of that analysis suggests that state classaction rules should be available in ADEA actions brought in
state courts.

B. Applying the Analysis to State Class Actions

Under the analysis described above, state court class-action
rules are not preempted by an opt-in provision in a federal
statute. Like rules regarding joinder, intervention and other
devices that determine who may be a party plaintiff, classaction devices are purely procedural.'
Such devices neither
limit'3 5 nor expand 3 6 jurisdiction. Nor do class-action rules
impose an additional substantive burden on individual
plaintiffs as a result of them bringing their actions in state
rather than federal courts.
In either jurisdiction, extra
procedural steps are required in order to prosecute individual
claims in a collective action. However, the procedural burden
on unnamed plaintiffs in state court class actions, where they
are included unless they affirmatively opt out of the action, is
less than the burden in an opt-in action, where they have to
file their consent with the court in order to be included in the
judgment. Such a difference does not run afoul of the rationale in cases where state procedures have been preempted due
to their substantive effect on federal rights. The rationale in
such cases has been that "[f]ederal law takes state courts as
it finds them only insofar as those courts employ rules that do
not 'impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery
authorized by federal laws.'"' 3 7 The U.S. Supreme Court
indicated recently in Felderv. Casey 38 that the converse is not

134.

Niehaus, 164 S.W.2d at 185; 3B JAMEs MOORE & JOHN E. KENNEDY, MooRE's

FEDERAL PRACTICE

23.02[51 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOORE'S].

135.
Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909,.912-13 (9th
Cir. 1964).
136.
See, e.g., Ballas v. Symm, 351 F. Supp. 876, 882 (S.D. Tex. 1972), affd,
494 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1974).
137.
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988) (quoting Brown v. Western Ry.,
338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949)).
138.
487 U.S. 131 (1988).
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a concern. The Court said, "States may make the litigation of
federal rights as congenial as they see fit-not as a quid pro
quo for compliance with other, uncongenial rules, but because
such congeniality does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress' goals."' 39

Furthermore, state class-action rules do not discriminate in
any manner against the substantive rights afforded under the
ADEA. The majority of state class-action procedures are
modeled after the modern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23140
and are applied uniformly to both state and federal causes of
action where the potential plaintiffs are sufficiently numerous
and the named plaintiff is an adequate representative for the
class.'
Also, unlike the notice-of-claim provision held
inapplicable in Felder, state class-action rules generally apply
across the board to all types of litigation in the state courts. 4 2
Finally, state class-action rules do not predictably alter the
outcome of the litigation from the result that would have
obtained had the action been brought in a federal rather than
a state court. Under either jurisdictional scheme, the federal

139.
Id. at 151.
140.
See supra note 10; see also Robert A. Skirnick & Patricia I. Avery, The
State Court Class Action-A Potpourriof Differences, 20 FORUM 750, 759 (1985).
141.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
142.
Although some states expressly accept, limit, or prohibit the use of class
actions in certain categories of cases, the relevant categories are unrelated to the
substantive thrust of the ADEA. See Skirnick & Avery, supra note 140, at 761 nn.55,
56. For state provisions that expressly accept the use of class actions, see, e.g., D.C.
CODE ANN. § 3-210.16 (1988) (mayoral actions regarding public assistance); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) (unpaid severance pay); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.360 (West 1989) (consumer pricing); MINN. STAT. § 325G.34
subdiv. 3 (1982) (Plain Language Contract Act); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1939
(West 1984) (nursing home residents); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110 (Law. Co-op. 1991)
(manufacture, distribution, or sale of motor vehicles); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.055
(West 1982) (taxpayer suits). For state provisions that expressly limit the use of class
actions, see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(1) (1991) (limits class actions for
consumer protection and unfair trade practices); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-4 (West 1989)
(limits on class actions in consumer contract cases); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10 (Michie
1987) (Unfair Practices Act limits remedies for class actions to actual damages except
that named plaintiffs may additionally recover penalties). And for state provisions
that expressly prohibit the use of class actions, see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-87-103
(Michie 1987) (class actions not permitted in Equal Consumer Credit Act); GA. CODE
ANN. § 7-3-29(e) (Michie 1989) (class actions not permitted to borrowers from
unlicensed lenders); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.5203.1 (West 1987) (class treatment not
available to remedy violations of the disclosure provision of Truth in Lending Act);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(b) (1983) (class actions prohibited in unfair trade practices
cases); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75C-5 (1985) (class actions not available under the Motion
Picture Fair Competition Act); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-6-113 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (class
actions not permitted for antitrust violations).
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statute dictates the substantive proof required to entitle a
plaintiff to the statutory remedy. 1 43 The class-action rules
merely dictate the procedures to be followed when numerous
similar causes of action are tried together in a group action.
There are some differences between the opt-in and opt-out
class-action schemes that have been the focus of judicial and
scholarly attention. 144 These differences, however, affect the
size of the class 1 45 rather than the substantive outcome of the
case. The substantive proof of the named plaintiffs is identical
and the relief available is precisely the same, regardless of
how many unnamed plaintiffs are included in the class they
represent.

143.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Ricketts v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1946).
144.
See, e.g., Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.
1984) (focusing on the greater burden on defendants and courts in opt-out class-action
schemes in contrast to opt-in class-action schemes); see also Biek, supra note 51, at
104-05 (noting the greater procedural burden on claimants wanting to join an opt-in
class action); James D. Lipschultz, The ClassAction Suit Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: CurrentStatus, Controversies,and Suggested Clarifications,
32 HASTINGS L.J. 1377, 1382-83, 1390-91 (1981) (citing the lack of a notice requirement for opt-in class actions).
145.
For example, the opt-out provision may result in a larger plaintiff class
because potential plaintiffs who do nothing are included under an opt-out provision
but excluded under an opt-in provision. This will arguably be accentuated where the
potential plaintiffs under the opt-in device are not given notice. In any case,
plaintiffs with small claims who were not included in the class action are unlikely to
bring separate individual actions. Small amounts at stake work to prevent such
actions both by influencing the individuals' decision and, arguably, by diminishing
the number of attorneys interested in handling the cases.
In addition, plaintiff classes under an opt-in arrangement may be smaller because
individual plaintiffs who are required to sign a consent may decline to do so out of
fear of possible employer reprisal. This proposal finds support in one commentator's
contention that private actions for back pay under the opt-in provisions of the FLSA
tend to be brought by ex-employees rather than employees who are still on the job.
See G.W. Foster, Jr., Jurisdiction,Rights, and Remedies for Group Wrongs Under the
FairLabor StandardsAct: SpecialFederalQuestions, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 295, 310; see
also James A. Rahl, The Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair
LaborStandardsAct, 37 ILL. L. REV. 119, 120 n. 10 (1942) (explaining that most suits
under § 16(b) of the FLSA are brought by ex-employees). Thus, even though
employer reprisals are illegal under § 623 of the ADEA, employees may still consider
the possibility of reprisal in making decisions as to whether to join the plaintiff class.
Finally, the plaintiff class may be smaller because under an opt-out device the
statute of limitations is tolled for unnamed plaintiffs as soon as the class action is
filed, see, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 345-46, 352-53
(1983), whereas the statute of limitations under the opt-in device is tolled only after
the plaintiff files her consent, see Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 256 (1988)
(incorporated by reference into § 626(e) of the ADEA). This means that some
potential plaintiffs who would have been included in a Rule 23 class would be barred
from participating in an opt-in class.
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It is true that the use of Rule 23 class actions creates a
potential for larger damage awards because the opt-out class
is more inclusive than the opt-in class. The opt-out class,
however, could not include any plaintiffs who were not
substantively entitled to participate in a class action. Thus,
under ideal circumstances the two classes would be the same
size. The employer's smaller exposure to damage awards
under the opt-in class is made possible only by procedurally
discouraging potential ADEA claimants from pursuing their
claims. Preemption concerns then would be implicated by the
greater inclusivity of the Rule 23 class action only if the opt-in
provision of the ADEA was intended to limit employer liability
by procedurally reducing the size of the substantively qualified
plaintiff class. Because the history of the ADEA's opt-in
provision suggests that its purpose was not to limit employer
liability at the expense of ADEA plaintiffs,'4 6 it does not
conflict with the use of Rule 23 class actions. The difference
in class size means mainly that attorneys may be more willing
to handle the larger class cases where the fees would be
correspondingly higher, and that the scope of defendants'
liability might be broader where the class was more inclusive.
These effects do not conflict with the purposes of the opt-in
provision of the ADEA.
1. The history of the FLSA opt-in provision-Some courts
have refused to apply Rule 23 class-action procedures to FLSA
claims under the theory that Congress added the opt-in
provision of the FLSA in order to limit employer liability.14 7
The original FLSA required employers to pay their employees
at least the federally mandated minimum wage and to pay
overtime for work performed in excess of forty hours per
week. 4 s When the Act was put into effect, however, controversies began to surface with regard to exactly what constituted compensable "work" under the Act. 49 The first industry

146.
See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1267.
147.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062-63
148.
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1988)).
See Muldowney v. Seaberg Elevator Co., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 275, 281-83
149.
(E.D.N.Y. 1941) (holding that a porter was not entitled to compensation for time
related to private pursuits even though he was required to stay at his employer's
place of business); Woods v. Wilkerson, 40 F. Supp. 131, 133 (W.D. La. 1941) (holding
that an oil well pumper was not entitled to compensation for all time on call where
he had the opportunity to engage in private pursuits); Thompson v. Daugherty, 40
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in which this question received significant judicial attention
was mining. The judiciary was called upon to determine
whether employees began "working" when they entered the
mines or not until they had descended the shaft and reached
the actual drilling site. The Supreme Court ruled in Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad v. Muscoda Local No. 123,150 that
the employees were entitled to compensation for the time
spent en route from the "portal" (entrance of the mine) to the
"working face" (drilling site) and back to the "portal," as well
as for the time spent at the working face 5 ' (thus, the term
"portal-to-portal"). This approach was extended to factory job
sites in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,152 and a flood of
litigation ensued
that threatened the financial ruin of many
15 3
industries.

F. Supp. 279, 283-84 (D. Md. 1941) (holding that a contract postal carrier was not
entitled to compensation for the time he spent waiting between trains); Sunshine
Mining Co. v. Carver, 41 F. Supp. 60, 66 (D. Idaho 1941) (holding that miners were
entitled to compensation for their travel time to their actual work location after they
entered the mine, but that they were not entitled to compensation for their subsurface lunch time); Travis v. Ray, 41 F. Supp. 6, 8-9 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (holding that
a bus driver was not entitled to compensation for his mid-route waiting periods);
Gordon v. Paducah Ice Mfg. Co., 41 F. Supp. 980, 986-87 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (holding
that workers who "iced" railroad cars containing perishables were not entitled to
compensation for the waiting time between trains); Super-Cold S.W. Co. v. McBride,
124 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding that leaving a telephone number or location
where he could be found was not enough to show that "on call" meant "at work");
Bulot v. Freeport Sulphur Co., Inc., 45 F. Supp. 380, 381 (E.D. La. 1942) (holding that
employees were not entitled to compensation for their travel time to the mine on an
optional, employer-provided boat); Walling v. Allied Messenger Serv., Inc., 47 F.
Supp. 773, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (finding that messengers were entitled to compensation for their waiting time); Shepler v. Crucible Fuel Co. of Am., 60 F. Supp. 260, 262
(W.D. Pa. 1943) (holding that a night watchman and a day landing man were not
entitled to compensation for their lunch periods), affd, 140 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir.
1944); Walling v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 846, 881-87, (W.D. La.
1943) (holding that loggers were not entitled to compensation for their travel time to
their work site on an employer-provided, optional train); Thompson v. Loring Oil Co.,
50 F. Supp. 213, 217 (W.D. La. 1943) (holding that an on-call oil pumper was not
entitled to compensation for the time he was not actually working); Howard v.
Southern Continental Tel. Co., 72 F. Supp. 276, 277 (M.D. Tenn. 1944) (holding that
a night shift switchboard operator was not entitled to compensation for his
uninterrupted periods of sleep); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No.
123, 321 U.S. 590, 591-603 (1944) (holding that miners were not entitled to
compensation for their underground travel time to the mine's "working face"); Armour
& Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 127-34 (1944) (holding that firemen were entitled
to compensation for their on call time at their employer's place of business); Bicanic
v. J.C. Campbell Co., 19 N.W.2d 7, 9-11 (Minn. 1945) (holding that logging camp's
cook and support staff were not entitled to compensation for their waiting time).
150.
321 U.S. 590 (1944).
151.
Id. at 598-600.
152.
328 U.S. 680, 690-94 (1946).
153.
For a good discussion of the development and scope of the "portal-toportal" problem, see Biek, supra note 51, at 122-23.
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Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act' 54 in direct response to this problem. 55 Although the opt-in provision was
added to the FLSA in the Portal-to-Portal Act, it is not at all
clear that the opt-in provision was intended to limit employer
liability by restricting collective suits. First and foremost, the
Portal-to-Portal Act was passed to remedy the problem created
when the judiciary extended the FLSA to cover employee
activities that had not customarily been considered compensable work.'5 6
The Portal-to-Portal Act dealt with this problem substantively. Part I of the Act contained the findings of Congress
and a declaration of policy and purposes of the Act.'5 7 Part II
provided relief from existing claims by limiting compensable
work to activities that were either (1) included in an express
provision of a contract in effect when the activity was performed or (2) recognized by custom or practice in effect at the
time the activity was performed at the establishment where
the employee was employed. 5 ' Part III provided relief from
future claims by excluding from compensable work the type of
activities that had been added judicially prior to the Portal-toPortal Act, unless those activities were part of an express
contract or were a clear matter of custom or practice at the
place of employment.' 5 9 The substantive provisions in Parts

154.
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 251-262 (1988)).
155.
The Act itself states:
The Congress hereby finds that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended, has been interpreted judicially in disregard of long-established
customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby
creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in
operation, upon employers with the results that, if said Act as so interpreted
or claims arising under such interpretations were permitted to stand, (1) the
payment of such liabilities would bring about financial ruin of many employers
and seriously impair the capital resources of many others, thereby resulting in
the reduction of industrial operations, halting of expansion and development,
curtailing employment, and the earning power of employees ....
Id. § 1(a), 61 Stat. at 84.
156.
See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
157.
See § 1, 61 Stat. at 84-85.
158.
See §§ 2, 3, 61 Stat. at 85-86.
159.
See § 4, 61 Stat. at 86-87. Part III of the Portal-to-Portal Act provided
in part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no employer shall be subject to any
liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
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II and III thus effectively brought the scope of liability under
the FLSA back to where it had been prior to the portal-toportal cases.
The opt-in provision, however, was included in Part IV of
the Act entitled "Miscellaneous." 6 ° Part IV dealt with a
variety of procedural provisions related to concerns other than
limiting employer liability.' 6 ' Section 6, for example, added a
two-year statute of limitations for FLSA actions.' 62 Prior to
the Portal-to-Portal Act, there was no federal statute of
limitations governing actions arising under the FLSA. Rather,
the state statutes of limitations were applied.'6 3 Congress
adopted a federal statute of limitations'6 4 because it found that
the variation in state limitations periods was creating problems for business and industry.6 5 Thus the federal limitations
period was adopted to promote uniformity rather than to limit
liability.

amended .... on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee
minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on
account of any of the following activities of such employee engaged in on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act [May 14, 1947](1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is
employed to perform, and
(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal
activity or activities,
which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such
employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at
which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.
Id.
160.
See 61 Stat. at 87.
161.
See §§ 5-15, 61 Stat. at 87-90.
162.
See § 6, 61 Stat. at 87-88.
163.
Fullerton v. Lamm, 163 P.2d 941, 944 (Or. 1945); Hollingsworth v. Cities
Serv. Oil Co., 199 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 774
(1947); Cannon v. Miller, 155 P.2d 500, 506 (Wash. 1945); see also Hays v. Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 162 P.2d 679, 682 (Cal. Ct. App.) (finding the FLSA
claim barred by the three-year statute of limitations in the state probate code), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 834 (1945); Phelan v. Carstens, Linnekin & Wilson, 62 N.Y.S.2d 214,
218 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1946) (finding the plaintiffs FLSA claim not barred by the state
two-year statute of limitations), rev'd on othergrounds, 69 N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y. Sup: Ct.
1947); Uhler v. Todd Houston Shipbuilding Corp., 198 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946) (applying a two-year statute of limitations to actions for debt where indebtedness was not evidenced by the contract writing).
164.
See Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. at 87-88.
165.
Id. at 85 ("The Congress further finds that the varying and extended
periods of time for which, under the laws of the several States, potential retroactive
liability may be imposed upon employers, have given and will give rise to great
difficulties in the sound and orderly conduct of business and industry.").
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Similarly, Congress's addition of the opt-in provision in
section 5166 appears to have been motivated by its concern with
procedural problems, rather than with limiting employer
liability for wage claims. The FLSA originally provided for
two types of group actions: the collective action (where an
employee could sue on behalf of himself and other similarly
situated employees) and the representative action (where an
employee could designate a representative to maintain an
1 67
action for and on behalf of all similarly situated employees).
Only the representative action, which had been something of
an oddity in class-action law to begin with, 16 was banned in
section 5 of the Act. 169 At the same time that Congress deleted
the language authorizing the use of representative suits from
section 216(b), it added the opt-in requirement for collective
suits.170

7
The Supreme Court in Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperlingl l
was presented with the argument that giving plaintiffs notice
of ADEA actions would contravene Congress's intention to
limit employer liability as expressed in the 1947 amendments
to the FLSA.172 The Court made clear its position that the optin provision was added to the FLSA for procedural reasons
rather than for purposes of limiting employer liability in
multiparty actions. The Court said:

166.
167.

Id.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(b) states:

Any employer who violates the provisions [for minimum wages or maximum
hours] of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the
amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of
competent jurisdictionby any one or more employees for and in behalfof himself
or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or
employees may designate an agent or representativeto maintainsuch action for
and in behalf of all employees similarly situated. The court in such action shall,
in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a
reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.
52 Stat. at 1060, 1069 (emphasis added).
See Elizabeth K. Spahn, Resurrectingthe Spurious Class: Opting-In to the
168.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act Through the Fair
Labor StandardsAct, 71 GEO. L.J. 119, 124-25 (1982).
169.
61 Stat. at 87.
Id.
170.
493 U.S. 165 (1989).
171.
See id. at 173.
172.
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In 1938, Congress gave employees and their "representatives" the right to bring actions to recover amounts due
under the FLSA. No written consent requirement of
joinder was specified by the statute. In enacting the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Congress made certain
changes in these procedures. In part responding to excessive litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking a personal
interest in the outcome, the representative action by
plaintiffs not themselves possessing claims was abolished,
and the requirement that an employee file a written
consent was added. The relevant amendment was for the
purpose of limiting private FLSA plaintiffs to employees
who asserted claims in their own right and freeing
employers of the burden of representative actions.
Congress left intact the "similarly situated" language
providing for collective actions, such as this one. The
broad remedial goal of the statute should be enforced to
173
the full extent of its terms.
Notwithstanding whether this argument can ever be
resolved definitively with regard to the FLSA, there is even
less reason to suppose that Congress intended to limit the
liability of employers under the ADEA by adopting the
enforcement mechanisms of the FLSA, which happened to
include the opt-in provision.
2. The history of the ADEA opt-in provision-The legislative
history in both the House and Senate reports is remarkably
silent on why Congress incorporated the FLSA enforcement
procedures into the ADEA. The major consideration for this
choice appears to have been administrative convenience.
Although there were suggestions that the ADEA should have
been simply an extension of Title VII protection to older
workers, 7 4 utilization of the existing EEOC enforcement
1 75
framework for ADEA claims was not envisioned.

173.
Id. (citations omitted).
174.
See Age Discriminationin Employment: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967) (statement of Sen. Smathers); id. at 32-33 (statement
of Sen. Murphy).
175.
At the time that the ADEA was being considered by Congress, the EEOC
was considered to be largely ineffectual. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later:

36

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL.

25:1

Rather, the ADEA as originally proposed was to have
agency-sponsored enforcement, which would have included
hearings before the Secretary of Labor and the right of appeal
to the U.S. courts of appeals. 176 This scheme, however, would

have necessitated the establishment of a separate new
bureaucracy, complete with hearing examiners, regional
directors, investigators, and attorneys, within the already
overburdened Department of Labor. 17 7 Congress therefore
chose to have ADEA claims administered through the existing
framework
of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department
17 8
of Labor.

Congress apparently felt that age-discrimination complaints
could be handled more efficiently by the Wage and Hour
Division. 179 Senator Javits had already attempted unsuccessfully to amend an FLSA bill earlier in 1967 to prohibit age

Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment OpportunityLaw Enforcement?, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1121, 1133-37 (1989).
There had been sentiment preferring Department of Labor enforcement over
enforcement by the EEOC even for Title VII. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,595-99 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case). By the time of the hearings on the ADEA, the
EEOC's only track record was its slow start. Its early years were, by necessity,
devoted to dealing with organizational problems and to developing regulations and
interpretative guidelines. Rose, supra, at 1135. It was soon swamped by charges and
began to fall further and further behind. Id. at 1136.
The Senate was apparently not impressed. Senator Javits had introduced a bill
earlier that year which would have amended the FLSA to prohibit age discrimination.
S.788, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1967); see also S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
13-14 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits). Like the incorporation of enforcement
procedures into the ADEA, that amendment would have utilized the "existing
investigative and enforcement machinery of the Wage and Hour Division into which
the functions of the administration and enforcement of the ban on age discrimination
could easily have been integrated." S. REP. No. 723, supra, at 13. When the FLSA
amendment failed, Senator Javits successfully implemented the provision for Wage
and Hour Division enforcement in the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
176.
See 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits, co-sponsor of the
Senate version of the bill); Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on Age
Discrimination Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 141-43, 412, 414 (1967) [hereinafter 1967
Hearings].
177.
See 1967 Hearings, supra note 176, at 145.
178.
See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7, 81
Stat. 602, 604 (1967). The statute as originally enacted provided for enforcement
through the Wage and Hour Division. See id. In July 1979, however, all Labor
Department responsibilities for the ADEA were transferred to the EEOC. Exec.
Order No. 12,144, 3 C.F.R. 404 (1980), reprinted as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 626
(1988).
179.
See 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits); 1967 Hearings,
supra note 176, at 141-43, 412-14.
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discrimination. 8 ° Like the incorporation of enforcement
procedures into the ADEA, the earlier amendment would have
utilized the "existing investigative and enforcement machinery
of the Wage and Hour Division into which the functions of
administration and enforcement of the ban on age discrimination could easily have been integrated."'
When that amendment failed, it was only natural for Senator8 Javits
to try to
2
ADEA.
the
in
provision
same
the
implement
There is thus little to suggest that the decision to administer
the ADEA and Title VII separately was intended to reflect
differences in the degree of protection to be afforded under the
respective acts. In addition, none of the distinctions between
age discrimination and the types of discrimination prohibited
by Title VII justify the different levels of protection afforded
by the opt-in class action of the ADEA as opposed to the optout class-action device of Title VII.
Age discrimination differs most markedly from other
prohibited forms of employment discrimination in that at some
point age really is related to job performance. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals said, "Age concededly differs from the
Title VII classifications in that, for some jobs, statistically
significant correlations might demonstrate that persons above
certain middle ages are inherently disabled from performing
as satisfactorily as their younger counterparts."8 3
This
distinction, however, does not justify a less inclusive classaction procedure for age than for Title VII discrimination.
Deterring illegal age discrimination in employment is the focus
of the ADEA 8 4 and illegal age discrimination necessarily
implies that an employer has made hiring and firing decisions
based on factors other than the worker's ability to do the job.
To the extent that Congress was concerned about limiting
employer liability because employment decisions based on age
were sometimes genuinely related to performance deficits,
Congress provided employers with a "bona fide occupational
qualification" defense.8 5 There is no basis for arguing that

180.
See S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1967) (individual views
of Sen. Javits).
181.
Id. at 13.
182.
See Biek, supra note 51, at 119-20.
183.
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 913 (1978).
184.
See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
185.
See Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 4(f), 81 Stat. at 603 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988)).
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Congress intended to create additional limitations in the form
of a class-action device which procedurally disadvantages
plaintiffs who are substantively entitled to the Act's protection.
The legislative history of the ADEA reflects a belief that age
discrimination also differs from other kinds of employment
discrimination in that age discrimination results from employer misinformation rather than ill will. The original study
undertaken by the Secretary of Labor to determine whether
legislation on age discrimination was necessary reported that
age discrimination in the workplace was pervasive and that its
impact on older workers was debilitating. 8 6 That same report
also voiced the belief that unlike racial discrimination, there
was "no evidence of prejudice based on dislike or intolerance
of the older worker. " 18 7 Rather, age discrimination was viewed
as being rooted in the misperceptions of employers that older
workers were less capable and less productive than their
This notion was echoed in the
younger counterparts.'
congressional debates on the ADEA:
Age discrimination is not the same as the insidious
discrimination based on race or creed prejudices and
bigotry. These discriminations result in nonemployment
because of feelings about a person entirely unrelated to
his ability to do a job. This is hardly a problem for the
older job seeker. Discrimination arises for him because of
assumptions that are made about the effects of age on
performance. 189

Congress clearly expected the educational programs provided
for in the Act 9 ° to go a long way toward correcting the problems
of age discrimination in employment.' 91 At the same time,

See THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 36, at 18-21.
186.
See id. at 6.
187.
See id. at 8-9.
188.
113 CONG. REC. 34,742 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Burke); see also id. at
189.
34,752 (remarks of Rep. Dwyer) (noting that employers fear, often inappropriately,
that older workers are less capable, adaptable, and have a shorter period of work
expectancy); id. at 31,254 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (remarking that age discrimination
is the result of employers' ignorance regarding older workers' abilities); 1967
Hearings,supra note 176, at 146.
ADEA § 3, 81 Stat. at 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1988)).
190.
As one senator stated:
191.
Everyone who testified at our hearings felt that the greatest need in this area
was to educate employers to the facts-facts which show that older workers are
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Congress recognized that some age discrimination resulted
from deeply ingrained prejudice and that strong enforcement
1 92
measures were needed to combat this discrimination:
The bill recognizes two distinct types of unfair discrimination based on age: First, the discrimination which is
the result of misunderstanding of the relationship of age
to usefulness; and second, the discrimination which is the
result of a deliberate disregard of a worker's value solely
because of age. The results of the two types of discrimination are the same, but the remedies called for are
different.
The obvious remedy for discrimination born of misunderstanding is the use of education, information, and
research-as provided for in section 3.
The second type of unfair discrimination is more
pernicious. To eliminate this more serious discrimination, H.R. 13054 provides prohibitions93against specific
practices of arbitrary discrimination. 1
The belief that some age discrimination is caused by misunderstanding does not justify giving less procedural protection to
age-discrimination plaintiffs under the opt-in provision of the
ADEA than that given to Title VII plaintiffs under Rule 23
class actions. The ADEA contains educational provisions 194 to
correct discriminatory attitudes based on misunderstanding and
enforcement provisions'9 5 to combat discrimination based on
prejudice.
When enforcement efforts are employed, the
discrimination involved must have been resistant to educational
and conciliatory efforts' 9 6 and may be presumed to be based on
prejudice. 197 Age discrimination based on prejudice is not

at least as productive as younger workers and that on average they stay with
It will be the major job of the
their employers for a longer period of time ....
Department of Labor under this bill to educate the country to the fact that older
workers are just as capable employees as younger workers.
113 CONG. REC. 31,253 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough).
See 113 CONG. REC. 34,745 (1967) (statement of Rep. Eilberg); id. at
192.
34,746 (statement of Rep. Daniels).
Id. at 34,747 (statement of Rep. Dent).
193.
194.
29 U.S.C. § 622 (1988).
Id. § 626.
195.
196.
Id. § 626(b).
See id. ("Before instituting any action under this section, the Equal
197.
Employment Opportunity Commission shall attempt to eliminate the discriminatory
practice or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance with the requirements
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different from sex or race discrimination in any respects
relevant to the procedural protections afforded under the classaction provisions of the two acts.
Finally, age discrimination may differ from other forms of
employment discrimination because of the self-corrective
aspect of age discrimination.1 9 Sex and race are immutable
characteristics. Thus, an individual who discriminates against
members of another race or sex takes action against a group
of which he will never be a part. Aging, on the other hand, is
universal-everyone will be old someday. This means that
actions taken against older persons may someday be applied
to the one who initially took the discriminatory action. Thus,
a person predisposed to discriminate against other racial or
gender groups might hesitate before discriminating against
older persons.
There is no evidence that this self-corrective aspect has
resulted in any discernible hesitation on the part of
employers to discriminate on the basis of age. More than
14,500 employment-related age-discrimination charges are
still filed with the EEOC each year.'9 9 The consistently
large number of age-discrimination claims filed each year
suggests that full procedural protection is necessary in
of this chapter through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.");
113 CONG. REC. 34,745 (1967) (statement of Rep. Eilberg) ("[T]he bill contains very real
and effective tools with which to launch new educational and persuasive programs
designed to eradicate discriminatory practices in employment. And, where these tools
fail, the bill provides machinery to enable governments and agencies to prevent
practices which cannot be otherwise overturned.").
198.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this aspect of age discrimination in
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). The Court
upheld, against an equal protection challenge, a state statute requiring state police
officers to retire at age 50. Id. at 317. The Court found that, unlike racial groups,
older persons did not constitute a discrete and insular minority deserving of
"extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process," because aging is
a process which affects everyone in society. Id. at 313 (quoting San Antonio Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). The fact that the Court did not find older
persons to be entitled as a group to special constitutional protection under the 14th
Amendment, however, does not negate the fact that Congress singled this group out
for special protection under the ADEA.
199.
The number of ADEA claims filed with the EEOC for the years 1981 to
1990 are as follows:
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

-

9,479
11,063
18,087
15,614
16,784

FY
FY
FY
FY
FY

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

-

17,443
15,121
14,882
14,789
14,526

OFFICE OF PROGRAM OPERATIONS, EEOC, ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS: FY 1981-FY 1990
(1991) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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order for the ADEA to achieve its goal of deterring illegal
age discrimination. Use of the more inclusive Rule 23 class
action does not conflict with the purposes of the ADEA, and
indeed comports more closely with the broad remedial
purposes of the Act than the out-dated opt-in provision. °°

C. State Class-Action Rules Do Not Conflict
with the Purposes of the ADEA

One may argue that the opt-in provision was included in the
ADEA by historical accident. Congress incorporated the opt-in
provision of the ADEA from the FLSA in 1967,201 just one year
after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were revised to
allow opt-out class actions.20 2 Before 1966, the type of class
action involved in the ADEA could only have been brought as
an opt-in action, even under Rule 23.203 In 1966, however,
200.
See Biek, supra note 51, at 118; Lipschultz, supra note 144, at 1377.
201.
Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7, 81 Stat. 602, 604 (1967) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 626 (1988)).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) advisory committee's note-1966 amend.
202.
The FLSA as originally enacted authorized three types of private suits:
203.
An employee could sue as an individual, could sue collectively on behalf of herself and
other similarly situated employees, or could maintain a representative action through
a designated agent for all employees similarly situated. Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 16(b),
52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988)). As
these actions were litigated, courts encountered problems of whether an individual
member of the class might be bound by a decision in which she had not participated.
Adopting a solution similar to that offered by the court in Shain v. Armour & Co., 40
F. Supp. 488, 490 (W.D. Ky. 1941), the Portal-to-Portal Act added the requirement
that plaintiffs in collective actions under the FLSA sign a written consent in order
to be included in the class, in effect banning representative actions altogether.
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 61-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988)). This congressional solution ensured that
individual plaintiffs whose rights were being adjudicated had knowledge of and were
willing to participate in litigation on their behalf.
This view of res judicata and due process depended on the then-current undeistanding of class actions as reflected in the original Rule 23. Rule 23 at that time provided
for three types of class actions: true, hybrid, and spurious. See Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing Work ofthe Civil Committee: 1966Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 377-86 (1967); James W. Moore & Marcus
Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 314-18 (1937).
In the "true" class suit, the right sought to be enforced by or against the class had
to be "joint" (tending to follow interpretation ofjoint rights in compulsory joinder of
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)), see 7A WRIGHT, supra note 55, § 1752, "common," see, e.g., Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 194'(1944) (suit by Black members of labor
union to enjoin race discrimination in collective-bargaining agreements), or
"secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right
and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it," WRIGHT, supra note
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Rule 23 was amended to allow opt-out class actions to bind all
parties who did not take action to exclude themselves.2 °4
Because of the proximity in time of the Rule 23 revision and
the enactment of the ADEA, Congress may not have been
aware of the ramifications of incorporating the opt-in rule of
the FLSA into the ADEA. Indeed, the opt-in provision of the
FLSA remained viable only because of an exemption buried in
the advisory committee notes to the Rule 23 revision.0 5 The
complex chain that Congress would have had to have followed
in order to understand how the FLSA, the ADEA, and Rule 23
interacted, argues at least that the ADEA's inclusion of the
now outdated opt-in provision was likely unintentional.
D. Availability of State Class Actions
Affected by Removal

Because state Rule 23 class-action procedures should not be
preempted by the procedural provision in section 216(b) of the

55, § 1752, at 16 (quoting an earlier version of Rule 23); see also Himmelblau v.
Haist, 195 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (shareholder derivative suit). "It was the
nondivisible nature of the right sued on which determined both the membership of
the class and the res judicata effect of the final determination of the right." MOORE'S,
supra note 134, 23.30. Wage claims under the FLSA involve individual rather than
common or joint rights and thus could not be brought as "true" class actions under
Rule 23.
Nor could FLSA actions be brought as "hybrid" class actions under Rule 23. The
"hybrid" class suit applied when the rights sought to be enforced were several and
related to specific property. See id. The judgment in a "hybrid" action was binding
on all members of the class, but only with regard to claims involving the specific
property involved. See id. Specific property was rarely at issue in FLSA suits.
The "spurious" class action under Rule 23 provided a means for the adjudication
in one lawsuit of a number of separate claims involving common questions of law or
fact where common relief was sought. See, e.g., Hunter v. Southern Indem.
Underwriters, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ky. 1942) (action to rescind and recover for
numerous individuals the price paid for bonds). While this type of Rule 23 class
action might have been applicable to FLSA suits, the judgment in "spurious" actions,
unlike the other Rule 23 class actions, was binding only on those who opted in to the
lawsuit. See Smith v. Abbate, 201 F. Supp. 105, 113, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
204.
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
205.
A parenthetical comment in the Committee notes states without
explanation that "[t]he present provisions of 29 U.S.C § 216(b) are not intended to be
affected by Rule 23, as amended." FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee's note-1966
amend.
Professor Spahn has suggested that this exception of§ 216(b) from the effect of the
revised Rule 23 was due to the advisory committee's belief that it did not have the
authority to alter the statutorily defined class procedures in the course of revising the
Federal Rules. Spahn, supra note 168, at 131.
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FLSA, plaintiffs may be able to take advantage of the Rule 23
class-action procedures for ADEA actions in state courts. That
advantage, though, would be neutralized to the extent that
defendants were able to remove ADEA cases to federal courts
where the opt-in provision of section 216(b) controls. The
issue of whether ADEA actions are removable is not yet
settled.
Because the ADEA specifically incorporates the enforcement
procedures of the FLSA, most of the case law relevant to the
issue of removability has dealt with the removability of FLSA
actions. Only two courts have specifically addressed the
question of whether ADEA actions are removable :and both
held that ADEA cases could be removed.2 °6 The main body of
precedent for ADEA removal, however, is still FLSA removal,
and there is a significant conflict among the
courts with
20 7
regard to the question of FLSA removability.
There are several threads to the removability question under
the FLSA. The Eighth Circuit in Johnson v. Butler Bros.2 °8
appears to have been the first circuit court to address the
question of removability of FLSA actions. 'The Johnson court
determined that FLSA actions were not removable. 20 9 Its
decision was based on the Act's language that an action could
"be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction."20 The

206.
See Baldwin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 F.2d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding no express prohibition against removal); Jacobi v. High Point Label, Inc., 442
F. Supp. 518, 521 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (holding that the defendant could remove his
ADEA action to federal court).
207.
While apparently favoring removability, Professor Moore and Mr. Ringle
note that "the courts still remain divided on the question of removability." 1A JAMES
W. MooRE & BRETr A. RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.167[5] (2d ed. 1991); see
also Walter W. Jones, Jr., Annotation, Removal from State Court to FederalDistrict
Court of Action for Wages Under § 16(b) of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b)), 10 A.L.R. FED. 919 (1972 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the circuit split
regarding removability).
208.
162 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1947).
209.
Id. at 90.
210.
Id. at 88-89 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). Section 216(b) provided as
follows:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this
title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case
may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to
recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction
by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and
other employees similarly situated.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. IV 1951).
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court interpreted this language as not only granting the
plaintiff the right to file his action in state courts, but also the
right to prosecute the action to final judgment in that court.2 1'
If this were not the intention of Congress, the court concluded,
the words "may be maintained in any court of competent
jurisdiction" merely stated a truism and were surplusage.2 1 2 A
Sixth Circuit district court in Maloy v. Friedman" added
support to this interpretation, observing that the U.S. Supreme
Court had twice construed the word "maintained" in a federal
statute to mean continuing or "keep[ing] from collapse a suit
already begun" 214 and that several cases had held that there
was a "well defined215 distinction between beginning and maintaining an action."
The Johnson decision came one year before Congress
amended the general removal statute by adding the phrase
"except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress."21 6
After amendment, the removal statute read in pertinent part
as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division
embracing the place where
21 7
such action is pending.
Some courts interpreted this change in the removal statute
to signal a stricter standard for denying removal. These
courts held that the FLSA's "may be maintained" language did
not qualify as an express exception to the authority to remove
actions to the federal courts. The court in Rossi v. Singer
Sewing Machine Co. 218 for example, noted that the plaintiffs

211.
Johnson, 162 F.2d at 89.
212.
Id.
213.
80 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
214.
Id. at 292 (citing George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 377
(1933); Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U.S. 56, 61 (1927)).
215.
Id. (citing In re Charles Nelson Co., 294 F. 926, 928-29 (N.D. Cal. 1924);
Roullard v. Gray, 175 P. 479, 480 (Cal. 1918)); see also National Fertilizer Co. v. Fall
River Five Cents Sav. Bank, 82 N.E. 671, 672 (Mass. 1907); Friel v. Alewel, 298 S.W.
762, 764 (Mo. 1927); Carson Rand Co. v. Stern, 31 S.W. 772, 773 (Mo. 1895).
216.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 937 (codified at 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441).
217.
218.

Id.
127 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1953).
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motion to remand an FLSA action to state court was based on
the line of cases that interpreted the FLSA's phrase "may be
maintained" to mean that an action filed in a state court
"could be prosecuted there to conclusion without removal."2 19
The court indicated that this line of cases appeared to have
been superseded by the 1948 revision of the federal removal
statute. 220 The district court in Niswanderv. Paul Hardeman,
Inc.221 broke with the Eighth Circuit's interpretation in
Johnson to adopt similar reasoning.22 2 The Niswander court
said that "if the question were now presented to the Court of
Appeals for this Circuit the result that would be reached
would be the opposite from that reached in Butler Brothers."22 3
A number of courts adopted the position that FLSA actions
were removable and that the phrase "may be maintained" in
the FLSA was not an express exception to removability under
the federal removal statute.22 4
Other courts continued to follow the Johnson court's interpretation of the "may be maintained" language. 225 The court in
Bintrim v. Bruce-Merilees Electric Co. 221 concluded that "'when
Congress used the word "maintain", it intended to create an
express exception to the removal statute.'" 227 The court in
Wilkins v. Renault Southwest, Inc. 22' also determined that the
language in the FLSA constituted an express exception within
the meaning of the removal statute's provision that actions could
be removed "except as otherwise expressly provided."2 29 In
reaching this decision, the Wilkins court relied on a senate report

219.
Id. at 54 (citing Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1947); M.L.
Cross, Annotation, Removal to Federal Court of Suit Brought in State Court for
Overtime Compensation Under FairLabor StandardsAct, 172 A.L.R. 1161 (1948)).
220.
127 F. Supp. at 54.
221.
223 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Ark. 1963).
222.
Id. at 76.
223.
Id.
224.
See, e.g., Ramos v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 632 F. Supp. 342,343 (S.D. Tex.
1986); Taylor v. Brown, 461 F. Supp. 559, 560 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Barrett v.
McDonald's of Okla. City, 419 F. Supp. 792, 795 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Anthony v. West
Coast Drug Co., 331 F. Supp. 1279, 1280-81 (W.D. Wash. 1971); Hill v. MossAmerican, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (N.D. Miss. 1970); Goettel v. Glenn Berry
Mfrs., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 884, 885 (N.D. Okla. 1964); Buckles v. Morristown Kayo Co.,
132 F. Supp. 555, 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
225.
See, e.g., Rolon v. Flexicore Co., 216 F. Supp. 954, 955-56 (D.P.R. 1963);
Dando v. Stonhard Co., 93 F. Supp. 270, 271 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
226.
520 F. Supp. 1026 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
227.
Id. at 1027 (quoting Haun v. Retail Credit Co., 420 F. Supp. 859, 862
(W.D. Pa. 1976)).
228.
227 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
229.
See id. at 648.
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in which the congressional intent concerning removability of

actions commenced under certain labor legislation was discussed.23 ° The report stated:
Congress itself has recognized the inadvisability of
permitting removal of cases arising under its own laws
which are similar to the workmen's compensation acts of the
States. In the Jones Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
the Railway Employers' Liability Act, all of which are in the
nature of workmen's compensation cases, the Congress has
given the workman the option of filing his case in either the
State court or the Federal court. If filed in the State courts
the law prohibits removal to the Federal court. 3 '
The Wilkins court indicated that this report made clear that
Congress, in its hearings on the jurisdictional amendments of the
removal statute, thought the Johnson court had correctly stated
the law. 2
Other courts have taken issue with this interpretation of the
discussion in the report, pointing out that the amendment under
discussion in that report involved 28 U.S.C. § 1445, a provision
making state workmen's compensation cases non-removable, and
that neither 28 U.S.C. § 1441 nor 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) was
mentioned or affected by the amendment.33 These courts view
the statement regarding the non-removability of the FLSA in the
report as nothing more than "an oblique reference" without
documentation.234
Many of the courts holding that the FLSA's "may be maintained" language was not an express exception to the removal
statute based their decisions on the notion that Congress knew
how to make express exceptions to the general rule of removability when it wanted to do so. 235 The fact that it had not done

230.
See id.
231.
S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3106.
232.
Wilkins, 227 F. Supp. at 648.
233.
See, e.g., Anthony v. West Coast Drug Co., 331 F. Supp. 1279, 1280-81
(W.D. Wash. 1971); Hill v. Moss-American, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 n.6 (N.D.
Miss. 1970).
234.
See Hill, 309 F. Supp. at 1177 n.6.
235.
See, e.g., West Coast Drug, 331 F. Supp. at 1281. Examples of express
prohibitions on removability include: actions under the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77v (1988); certain actions against railroads, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a), (b) (1988);
and actions arising under state workers' compensation laws, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1988).
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so with the FLSA was, in their view, indicative of a congressional
intent for FLSA actions to be removable.23 6
The weight of authority on this issue has tipped recently in
the direction of allowing removal. The First Circuit Court of
Appeals in Cosme Nieves v. Deshler237 said:
Section 1441(a) explicitly states than an express provision
by Act of Congress is required to preclude the right to
removal. We think the words "expressly provided" must
be construed to mean exactly that. Lacking an explicit
statutory directive by Congress that the customary right
to remove is abrogated in the instance of FLSA suits, we
decline to prohibit their removal. The words "may be
maintained" are ambiguous; at best they are suggestive.
They are not an express provision barring the exercise of
the right to removal.2 3
This decision adds significantly to the authority favoring
removability of the FLSA in general.
The two courts that have addressed the specific question of
the removability of ADEA actions have both favored removability as well. The decision of the court in Jacobi v. High
Point Label, Inc. ,239 amounted to little more than another
district court choosing up sides in the "may be maintained" as
an "express exception" controversy. 24 ° The court noted that the
ADEA specifically incorporated the enforcement procedures of
the FLSA, 241 and that the cases dealing with the question of
removability of the FLSA were in conflict. 242 The court then
joined what it saw as the growing majority of cases in holding
that the "may be maintained" language of the FLSA did not
qualify as an express exception to the general rule of removability.24 3 The court pointed out that section 626(c) of the
ADEA provided only that a person aggrieved "may bring" a

236.
See, e.g., Hill, 309 F. Supp. at 1177-78; Goettel v. Glenn Berry Mfrs., Inc.,
236 F. Supp. 884, 885 (N.D. Okla. 1964); Asher v. William L. Crow Constr. Co., 118
F. Supp. 495, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
237.
786 F.2d 445 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986).
238.
Id. at 451 (footnote and citations omitted).
239.
442 F. Supp. 518 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
240.
See id. at 521.
241.
See id. at 520.
242.
See id.
243.
See id. at 521.
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civil action, as opposed to being able to "maintain" an action
as under the FLSA, but then it referred to the ADEA's
incorporation of the FLSA enforcement procedures, and chose
not to distinguish the analysis of the two acts. 2 "
The Fifth Circuit in Baldwin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 245 also
recognized that Congress intended that the ADEA be enforced
under section 216 of the FLSA,24' and indicated further that
the issue of removability of FLSA actions was not settled.2 47
The court then specifically declined to address the question of
removability of the FLSA actions.2 48 It decided, based on the
language of section 626(c)(1) of the ADEA that a plaintiff "may
bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction,"
that ADEA actions were removable because there was no
express prohibition against removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). 249 The court made no attempt to reconcile its
straightforward analysis of the ADEA's language with the
statutory incorporation of the FLSA's enforcement mechanisms into the ADEA. The court noted that even if ADEA
actions were not removable, the particular action in
question
250
would have been removable under section 1441(c).
While the courts allowing removal of FLSA and ADEA
actions constitute a growing majority, both courts and commentators have recognized that there are significant policy
reasons for favoring the non-removability of these actions.
Removal creates practical problems which make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to enforce their federal statutory rights.
The court in Wilkins v. Renault Southwest, inc., 25 1 for example,
said:
[R]emoval [is] an obvious tactic by which the defendant
could delay, increase the costs of litigation and harass the
plaintiff. Where the employee commences [an FLSA] suit
in a state court far removed from the nearest federal court

244.
See id.
245.
667 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1982).
246.
See id. at 460.
247.
See id.
248.
See id. at 461.
249.
See id.
250.
See id. at 461 n.6 ("Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 the court would have original
jurisdiction of appellant's breach of contract claim, and that claim, if sued upon alone
would be removable; therefore, the entire case would be removable pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441(c).').
251.
227 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
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the cost of travel and subsistence of the claimant, his
witnesses and attorneys, would amount to a denial of the
very cause of action conferred by Congress in Section
25 2
216(b).
Other courts have echoed this view,253 including some of
those that have allowed removal of FLSA actions. 254 The
American Law Institute, noting that FLSA actions are
typically for small amounts and, as such, would invite removal
as a harassing tactic, recommended that wage actions under
the FLSA be non-removable.2 5 5
One commentator has stated that one of the original
purposes for granting concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate
federal rights was to eliminate the necessity for litigants to
travel great distances to federal forums. 25'
An equally
important reason was to prevent congestion of the federal
courts with the great volume of cases engendered by federal
statutes.2 57 There can be little disagreement that the 1948
amendments to the removal statute were aimed at avoiding
the expansion of federal jurisdiction through removal.5 8
Nevertheless, several courts have indicated that even assuming a congressional intent to restrict jurisdiction of the federal
courts, it is impossible to ignore the language of the removal
statute requiring an "express exception" to make an action
non-removable.2 59
Defendants will not always remove, of course. Some will fail
to seek removal within the thirty-day period provided by

252.
Id. at 648.
253.
See, e.g., Carter v. Hill & Hill Truck Line, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 429, 430
(S.D. Tex. 1966) (denying removal).
254.
See, e.g., Jacobson v. Holiday Travel, Inc., 110 F.R.D. 424, 425 (E.D. Wis.
1986) (allowing removal generally, but remanding in this case because of procedurally
improper removal); Hill v. Moss-American, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (N.D. Miss.
1970) (allowing removal).
255.
AMERICAI LAW INsT., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 26, 195 (1969).
256.

Charles Warren, Federal CriminalLaws and the State Courts, 38 HARv.

L. REV. 545, 551 (1925).
257.
Felix Frankfurter, Distributionof JudicialPower Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 516-17 (1928).
258.
See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 9-10 (1951);
Wilkins v. Renault S.W., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 647, 648 (N.D. Tex. 1964); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1441 historical and revision note (1988) (stating that the revision "will
somewhat decrease the volume of Federal litigation").
259.
See, e.g., Goettel v. Glenn Berry Mfrs., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 884, 885 (N.D.
Okla. 1964); Asher v. William L. Crow Constr. Co., 118 F. Supp. 495, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Bradley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 100 F. Supp. 913, 915 (E.D.
Okla. 1951).
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statute.6 ° Others may wish to take advantage of the delay in
more crowded state court dockets 26 ' or state rules of procedure
they view as being more favorable to their case. 26 2 Some may
want to have their case heard by judges they know or juries
selected from a pool they believe will be inclined to view their
case sympathetically. 3 Some may be influenced by the convenience of the forum's location. 2 4 When the question of
removability does arise, only three circuit courts have addressed the issue 26 5 and, of those three, two have allowed
removal.26 6 However, the availability of Rule 23 class actions
for ADEA actions in the state courts would certainly sharpen
this controversy. In circuits where the issue has not been
decided, the courts should focus on the remedial purpose of the
ADEA and its protection of civil rights as well as the policies
favoring non-removal of the FLSA. The language of the
statute should then be interpreted to give the plaintiff
maximal protection by holding ADEA actions to be nonremovable.
The best course of action, of course, would be for Congress
to amend the "living fossil" of section 216(b) to allow for Rule
23 class actions to bring it in line with all other contemporary
class-action suits. Meanwhile, the judiciary should construe
the removal statute as prohibiting removal of ADEA suits.
260.

28 U.S.C. § 1446 provides:

(b) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within
thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of
a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such
action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons
upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is
not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1988).
261.
Cf. Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationalesfor FederalQuestion Jurisdiction:
An EmpiricalExaminationof Student Rights Litigation,1984 WIS. L. REV. 1315, 1359
(discussing how lawyers tend to use forum shopping to avoid delay).
262.
See id. at 1361-62.
263.
See id. at 1352-58; Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in
ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 731-32 & n.20 (1981).
264.
See, e.g., Gulf Offshore Co., Div. of Pool Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S.
473, 484 (1981); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal 'Question" in the District Courts, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 157, 159 (1953).

265.
See Cosine Nieves v. Deshler, 786 F.2d 445, 451 (1st Cir. 1986); Baldwin
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 F.2d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Butler Bros.,
162 F.2d 87, 89-90 (8th Cir. 1947).
266.
See Cosine Nieves, 786 F.2d at 451 (FLSA actions removable); Baldwin,
667 F.2d at 461 (ADEA actions removable).
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CONCLUSION

The opt-in class action is an anachronism. Until it is
updated, age-discrimination litigants may be able to take
advantage of the fuller protections available in Rule 23 class
actions by bringing their ADEA cases in state courts. The
general rule is that state procedures control in state courts,
even when the cause of action being enforced is federal. State
class-action procedures do not discriminate against federal
causes of action, are not outcome determinative, and do not
conflict with the purposes of the ADEA. Therefore, state
procedures regarding the conduct of class actions should not
be preempted. This should be the result even though the
ADEA contains a procedural provision which specifies contrary
class-action procedures.
Plaintiffs' ability to utilize state Rule 23 class-action
procedures in ADEA litigation depends on the case being
maintained in the state courts. ADEA actions, however, may
be subject to removal to federal court where the opt-in provision of the ADEA would control. The majority of circuits have
not yet determined whether ADEA actions are removable. The
circuits that have addressed the issue are split, with such
actions currently non-removable in one circuit and removable
in two others. Significant policy considerations favor interpreting ADEA actions to be non-removable.
Utilizing state court Rule 23 class-action procedures would
allow age-discrimination litigants to take advantage of added
procedural protections that have always been afforded to
victims of sex and race discrimination.

